Boris Jordan Makes the Case for Aurora — and Predicts a Cannabis M&A Wave in 2027

Curaleaf Chairman and CEO Boris Jordan is making the case for acquiring Aurora Cannabis on more than the premium attached to the offer.

In a wide-ranging interview with veteran cannabis equity analyst Pablo Zuanic, founder and managing partner of Zuanic & Associates, Jordan laid out how he sees Aurora fitting into Curaleaf’s international strategy, why he believes replicating Curaleaf’s European platform would now cost more than $1 billion, why he expects consolidation among major cannabis operators to accelerate, and why he believes the U.S. cannabis business could be entering a markedly different operating environment in 2027.

Jordan also addressed some of the harder questions surrounding the proposed Aurora transaction: Curaleaf’s leverage and tax liabilities, the economics of the acquisition, whether another bidder could take Aurora away, whether Curaleaf has alternatives if the deal fails, and the difficulties inherent in pursuing an unsolicited transaction.

Most significantly for the immediate transaction, Jordan said Curaleaf expects to make its formal bid early next week, potentially Monday, after a conversation with Aurora CEO Miguel Martin that Jordan characterized as leaving the question to Aurora’s special committee once an actual bid is submitted.

“I can’t guarantee 100% that this deal gets done,” Jordan said.

But the Aurora transaction was only part of the conversation.

The broader argument Jordan presented to Zuanic is that cannabis is approaching another stage of its development: one in which scale, distribution, international regulatory infrastructure and consolidation become increasingly important — and in which the companies that survived the industry’s difficult last three years may be better positioned to operate through the next cycle.

Why Not Buy U.S. Capacity Instead?

The portion of the interview available to IgniteIt begins with Zuanic challenging the international strategy from another direction.

If Curaleaf ultimately needs cultivation capacity, Zuanic asked, why not acquire U.S. capacity such as Glass House Brands, which has built large-scale cultivation infrastructure and has argued that it is positioned for a more open national market?

Jordan’s response was fundamentally about timing.

“I think that Glass House is a great company,” Jordan said, but added that he would not build an acquisition strategy around a regulatory outcome that has not yet occurred.

“I’m not going to go out and spend a billion dollars on an asset where we don’t know whether we’re going to get the export and the interstate commerce at this point.”

Jordan put his own timeline for those changes at a “minimum 12 to 18 months out.”

That distinction matters because Jordan does not describe Aurora as a substitute for a future U.S. interstate-commerce strategy.

Instead, he described the transaction much more narrowly.

“This is our premium play for Europe,” Jordan said. “This doesn’t even touch our mid-market and a low-end product. This is just premium play in Europe.”

That premium strategy is where Aurora fits more precisely. Earlier in the conversation, Jordan pointed to Aurora’s GMP production capabilities and genetics program, including the work of its scientists, as assets Curaleaf sees as valuable for supplying the premium segment. The combination, as Jordan described it, would pair those capabilities with Curaleaf’s existing international scale and distribution infrastructure.

Jordan also argued that the companies could bring different operating strengths to the combination. He pointed to Aurora’s higher SG&A as an area where Curaleaf could potentially generate efficiencies, while Curaleaf could provide broader distribution for Aurora’s products. The opportunity, in Jordan’s telling, is not simply to acquire more cultivation capacity, but to combine premium genetics and GMP production with a larger distribution platform.

Zuanic Challenges Curaleaf’s Position of Strength

Zuanic then went directly at an unusual feature of the proposed transaction.

Given the longstanding structural disadvantages U.S. cannabis operators have faced in public markets, Zuanic said he would have expected a Nasdaq-listed Canadian licensed producer to be acquiring an MSO rather than the other way around.

Was Curaleaf really approaching Aurora from a position of strength?

Jordan argued that the exchange on which a company trades is less important than the underlying quality of the business and the valuation investors assign to it.

“I don’t think stock exchanges are the key,” Jordan said. “It’s the quality of your business that’s the key.”

Jordan argued that Curaleaf had delivered for shareholders and said its relative stock performance had earned it a premium compared with other cannabis companies.

He also placed that performance within a much harsher industry context.

“The whole cannabis industry has retreated by 90 percent,” Jordan said.

His argument was not that Curaleaf had escaped the industry’s collapse in valuations, but that investors still differentiate among operators even after that decline.

“I believe markets are efficient, and they decide,” Jordan said.

He described his response when Curaleaf itself traded at lower valuations in operational rather than promotional terms.

“I didn’t run around [and] say I’m undervalued,” Jordan said. “I ran around. I said, how can I improve my business to make sure I’m trading at a premium, and that’s what you have to do.”

Is the MSO Model Still Sustainable?

Zuanic then raised a question he said institutional investors routinely ask about cannabis: whether the MSO model remains sustainable amid price compression and declining margins. Jordan was bullish on the outlook.

“I think we’re setting up for a very, very good 2027,” he said, pointing first to changes in the hemp market.

Jordan said he had just come from a meeting on the issue and does not expect the current federal hemp framework to be renewed after its extension. He argued that states where intoxicating hemp products have been restricted are already showing benefits for licensed cannabis operators.

Jordan specifically cited Ohio, where he said Curaleaf had seen approximately 20% quarter-over-quarter growth associated with hemp going away, including changes in traffic, foot traffic, and average transaction values.

From there, he made a broader industry forecast.

“So I estimate about 10 to 15% organic industry growth next year on the back of just the hemp decision,” Jordan said.

That is Jordan’s forecast, not an industry consensus, and it depends heavily on how federal and state hemp rules ultimately develop.

His second argument concerned illicit supply.

Jordan said federal enforcement against illegal cultivation in Oklahoma and Maine, with California also being targeted, could reduce the volume of illicit product moving through the national market. He did not argue that enforcement could eliminate the illicit market.

“You can’t shut down the illicit market completely. We all know that,” Jordan said.

Jordan believes reduced illicit supply, combined with what he sees as insufficient regulated capacity, could reverse pricing pressure.

“I actually think that we might see price appreciation next year, not price compression,” he said, adding that prices are already stabilizing.

He also argued that three difficult years have forced the industry to become more efficient.

“We’ve all become better operators,” Jordan said.

Combined with what he expects to be a less burdensome regulatory environment under Schedule III, Jordan believes those operating improvements strengthen the existing MSO model.

“I think the MSO model works completely now,” he said.

Jordan did acknowledge that full federal legalization would change that equation.

If the country were moving immediately into full legalization, he said, the MSO structure would have issues requiring adaptation. Curaleaf and its competitors are already thinking about those changes because Jordan believes they will eventually arrive.

For now, however, his thesis remains centered on vertical integration and control of distribution.

“If you own the distribution, you control the market and the shelf,” Jordan said.

What About Curaleaf’s Debt and Tax Liabilities?

Zuanic then turned directly to Curaleaf’s balance sheet.

He asked Jordan for a quick assessment of Curaleaf’s leverage and tax debt — an important question when the company is simultaneously proposing another acquisition.

Jordan said he was comfortable with both.

“We’re going to produce, you know, almost 100 million of free cash this year,” he said.

He acknowledged that Curaleaf carries more debt than some competitors but connected part of that leverage to the company’s investment in Europe.

Jordan described Curaleaf as having invested approximately $450 million building its European business and placed the addressable population of the market at roughly 700 million people.

“Our debt is a little bit higher than some of our competitors because I built a 450 million business in Europe,” Jordan said.

On taxes, Jordan said Curaleaf is no longer accumulating the liability going forward this year and is waiting to see how the IRS treats historical amounts.

“We think it’s very manageable,” he said. “Our business is getting stronger and stronger. So I’m not particularly worried about it.”

The balance-sheet question also extends directly to the Aurora offer. Earlier in the conversation, Jordan indicated that cash availability was not an obstacle to completing the proposed transaction, arguing that Curaleaf has the financial capacity to pursue Aurora while continuing to operate and invest in its broader international platform.

Zuanic Runs the Aurora Math

Zuanic then connected those European investments directly to Aurora.

He noted Jordan’s previously stated roughly $450 million investment in Curaleaf’s European and international platform and walked through his own calculation of Aurora’s effective acquisition cost.

The transcription becomes imperfect during the calculation, so the numbers should be understood as Zuanic’s on-air math rather than company guidance.

Zuanic referenced the $4-per-share proposal, approximately 65 million Aurora shares, roughly $260 million in implied value, and approximately $100 million of Aurora cash. He arrived at an estimated net cost in the neighborhood of $155 million, describing the Aurora component as roughly a $150 million proposition after accounting for cash.

The question was straightforward: Given what Curaleaf has already spent building internationally, did that math make Aurora particularly attractive as a complement to the platform?

“I wouldn’t be making the bid if I didn’t,” Jordan answered.

Jordan said he would not make an acquisition he considered unattractive to Curaleaf shareholders.

But he simultaneously argued that Curaleaf stock makes the proposal attractive to Aurora shareholders. Jordan criticized Aurora’s longer-term growth record, saying that in his assessment the company had seen no growth over the last eight years, only declines. He contrasted that with Curaleaf’s larger marketplace, including its U.S. operations.

Jordan then turned to valuation. He said Curaleaf trades at roughly a 10-to-12 multiple, compared with approximately four-to-five for Aurora.

“I think the market has spoken about who they think is the better asset,” Jordan said.

Jordan’s strategic case went beyond valuation. He argued that Curaleaf could make Aurora a more efficient business by combining its products and production capabilities with Curaleaf’s larger distribution network and operating platform. He also pointed to Curaleaf’s existing international scale, describing it as the leading operator in the UK, Germany and Australia, and said Curaleaf grows roughly 2.5 times as much cannabis as Aurora in Canada.

The combination, in his telling, creates opportunities for operational cross-pollination in both directions: Aurora contributes premium genetics, scientific expertise and GMP production capacity, while Curaleaf contributes scale, distribution and opportunities to reduce costs. Jordan specifically identified Aurora’s SG&A structure as an area where a combined operation could potentially become more efficient.

Does Aurora Trigger the Cannabis Consolidation Wave?

Zuanic next moved beyond Aurora.

Regardless of whether Curaleaf ultimately acquires the company, he asked, could the bid push Canadian LPs toward mergers among themselves, combinations with U.S. MSOs or other strategic transactions?

Jordan believes consolidation is coming with or without Aurora.

“I’ve always said I believe this sector needs to consolidate, irrespective of my deal with Aurora,” he said.

Jordan argued that the Canadian and U.S. cannabis industries cannot indefinitely support approximately 150 separate operators. His comparison was to alcohol and other consumer-products industries, where scale and volume create strong incentives for consolidation.

“This is a velocity-volume-based business,” Jordan said.

The problem, in his view, is duplicated corporate and operating infrastructure. Running numerous platforms alongside one another can double or even triple costs.

Then Jordan put a striking number on what consolidation could potentially accomplish.

“As I’ve said, two MSOs merging, 150 to 200 million dollars of cost savings, literally within 12 months.”

The $150 million to $200 million figure was a broad statement about the potential economics of combining two MSOs, not a synergy estimate for the Aurora transaction.

Curaleaf has separately said the proposed Aurora combination could generate at least $40 million in annual cost synergies. The company has described a potential combined business with approximately $1.5 billion in annual revenue and nearly $350 million in adjusted EBITDA.

Jordan also explained why the industry’s largest combinations have not happened already.

Companies are waiting.

Some, Jordan said, are waiting for federal rescheduling because they expect their stocks to rally. Others are waiting because they want greater clarity regarding how much tax debt will remain on their balance sheets.

That uncertainty has held back major combinations even as smaller tuck-in acquisitions continue.

Jordan expects that dam to break.

“In 2027, my prediction is going to be that there’s going to be several very large transactions,” he said.

And he emphasized what he meant by large: transactions among major cannabis operators designed to extract efficiencies and make the combined businesses more competitive.

Can Someone Simply Replicate Curaleaf’s European Platform?

Zuanic’s next question went directly to the international moat Jordan believes Curaleaf has created.

Could another company simply acquire Canadian GMP production capacity, add distribution in Germany and the United Kingdom, and quickly replicate Curaleaf’s scale?

Zuanic characterized that idea as potentially naive and asked Jordan whether he agreed. Jordan did.

“I completely disagree,” Jordan said of the idea that the platform could be easily replicated. “I think it’s a lot more complicated than bolting assets.”

The central distinction, according to Jordan, is that European medical cannabis operates much more like a pharmaceutical industry than the U.S. cannabis business.

That means stability studies. It means GMP supply chains. It means regulatory approval of genetics. It means working market by market through regulatory systems that can take years to navigate.

That helps explain why Aurora’s genetics and scientific capabilities matter to Curaleaf. Jordan spoke positively earlier in the interview about the work Aurora’s scientists have done developing genetics. For Curaleaf, Aurora would provide established GMP-scale production and premium genetics rather than simply another source of commodity flower.

Jordan pointed to Spain as an example of how long that infrastructure can take to develop.

“Our Spanish approval — we got the first approval for product in Spain — took six years, Pablo, to get six years to get the approval for those products.”

Simply buying cultivation and distribution infrastructure, therefore, does not recreate the approvals, regulatory history and relationships attached to the platform.

Jordan put a value on that barrier.

“I believe replicating the Curaleaf platform would be well over a billion dollars right now in the European market,” he said.

He expects that figure to increase as additional markets open.

Jordan then offered Turkey as another example of why early regulatory access matters.

He said he personally worked on opening the Turkish market and met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as part of that effort. Jordan said cannabis licenses there cannot simply be purchased during the current restricted period.

His larger point was that early entry can produce regulatory relationships and name recognition that cannot necessarily be recreated through an acquisition.

The 15% Margin Problem

Jordan also drew a sharp distinction between building a pharmaceutical cannabis platform and simply moving cannabis through European distribution channels.

He pointed to acquisitions by Canadian companies in Germany that have generated substantial volume increases but, according to Jordan, are doing so at gross margins around 15%.

“They’re just flipping flower,” Jordan said. “That’s all they’re doing.”

That distinction gets to the heart of Jordan’s Aurora thesis. Curaleaf is not looking merely for another distributor or a business capable of moving more third-party flower. His comments suggest the company wants proprietary products and brands supported by genetics, scientific development and GMP-compliant production. Aurora’s capabilities fit that premium strategy in a way that, in Jordan’s view, simple distribution assets do not.

Jordan argued that those distribution businesses are not necessarily creating brands or proprietary patient databases.

His description of Curaleaf’s strategy is different.

The transcript becomes garbled when Jordan begins quantifying the size of Curaleaf’s medical database, so no numerical figure should be attributed to him from this recording. What is clear is that he described it as “one of the largest medical databases in Europe” and said Curaleaf is conducting human trials involving the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency.

“This is a pharmaceutical business,” Jordan said. “This is not a consumer packaged goods business.”

Jordan said he has been building the European operation for more than four years, after having spent approximately 30 years building companies in Europe.

He also referenced having built what he described as Europe’s largest data-center business before cannabis.

And the amount of executive attention he is allocating to Europe is substantial.

“I spent 50% of my time on European business,” Jordan said.

Aurora Is the Premium Strategy — But There Is a Plan B

Zuanic then challenged Jordan on another potential weakness in the Aurora thesis.

If Aurora represents premium supply, what happens to the much larger mainstream portion of the market?

Zuanic said he understood premium to represent roughly 10% of the market and suggested that Curaleaf might have a more urgent need to secure mainstream supply.

Jordan pushed back on the suggestion that Curaleaf lacked a Plan B, saying the company has alternatives for both mid-tier and lower-priced products. He pointed to a recently signed $20 million supply agreement with Cannara, which Curaleaf is using to test product quality and the supply chain before potentially expanding the agreement threefold.

Curaleaf is also talking with other companies, meaning Aurora is not its only option for international supply but, in Jordan’s view, the best fit for its premium strategy.

“What I said was that this is the best fit,” he said, while acknowledging the deal is far from certain.

“I’m not going to say this deal is going to close 100%,” Jordan said, adding that he would walk away if another bidder offered more.

“I’m happy to lose the deal on price,” he said. “I am focused. I want to get this deal done.”

Even so, he described Aurora as only “a small piece of our international strategy,” emphasizing that Curaleaf has other initiatives underway.

That distinction is important. Aurora is not being positioned as the solution to every segment Curaleaf wants to serve internationally. Jordan described it as the premium component of a broader supply strategy, with other relationships available for mid-tier and lower-priced products. The attraction is the combination of premium genetics and GMP-scale production with a Curaleaf platform that Jordan argues already has substantially greater international reach.

Can a Hostile Deal Actually Work?

Zuanic saved one of the most important questions for the end.

Jordan has extensive experience with M&A outside cannabis, Zuanic noted, but hostile transactions are difficult. Even if a hostile bidder succeeds in acquiring a company, integration can become more complicated.

Did Jordan have concerns about executing and integrating a deal that had begun on hostile terms?

The Canadian takeover framework also gives the process a long runway. Jordan referenced the 105 days during the earlier portion of the interview. Under Canada’s National Instrument 62-104, a takeover bid generally must remain open for an initial deposit period of at least 105 days. The target can shorten that period, but generally not below 35 days; the rules also require more than 50% of the shares subject to the bid, excluding those controlled by the bidder and joint actors, to be tendered before the bidder can take them up.

In practice, the framework gives Aurora’s board and shareholders time to evaluate the offer and leaves room for negotiations, an alternative transaction or another bidder. The 105-day regime was introduced in part to give target boards more time to respond to unsolicited bids.

Jordan first pushed back against the characterization that hostility was Curaleaf’s preferred route.

“I didn’t want this to be a hostile deal,” he said.

Jordan said he called Aurora CEO Miguel Martin and that the companies had communicated, but he characterized Aurora’s response as essentially a rejection rather than substantive negotiations.

Jordan claimed Aurora had sent a message amounting to: “We’re not interested at this time.”

The characterization is Jordan’s, and Aurora has publicly presented a different account of the parties’ communications. Aurora said its lead independent director corresponded with Jordan as recently as July 24 and did not discourage continuing dialogue.

Jordan argued that a company receiving an approach from a major industry player at what he described as a 45% premium should at least engage in a conversation, even if the board ultimately rejects the proposal.

“You don’t have to accept the bid,” he said, “but you at least sit down, and you have a conversation.”

Jordan said Curaleaf had created a website for the proposed transaction and intended to publish its communications there.

But despite the adversarial rhetoric surrounding the approach, Jordan acknowledged the uncertainty.

“I can’t guarantee 100% that this deal gets done,” he said.

He said analysts and bankers who had contacted Curaleaf generally viewed the strategic fit favorably, although those conversations represent Jordan’s characterization and are not independently documented in the interview.

Zuanic then asked whether Jordan’s conversation with Martin earlier that day had made him more optimistic about the deal.

“I’m always optimistic, as you know, Pablo,” Jordan said, while cautioning against reading too much into the exchange.

“Miguel gave me nothing today,” he said. “He didn’t say yes or no. He said, ‘ Make a bid, and then we have a special committee. We’ll review the bid.”

Curaleaf now intends to do exactly that.

“We have to make the bid, which we’re going to do here early next week, probably on Monday,” Jordan said.

“Then we’ll sit down,” Jordan said. “We’ll have a conversation after they evaluate that bid.”

Jordan’s Message to Aurora Shareholders

Zuanic closed the interview by allowing Jordan to speak directly to Aurora shareholders.

Jordan placed the proposed acquisition within what he sees as a broader turning point for cannabis.

“This industry is coming out [of] a very difficult period of time,” he said, arguing that the emergence of transactions like the Aurora proposal is itself a consequence of that period.

His pitch to Aurora investors ultimately comes down to Curaleaf equity.

Jordan believes Aurora shareholders would have greater upside owning Curaleaf shares than remaining solely exposed to Aurora, both because of Curaleaf’s operating platform and because of the regulatory catalysts he expects in the United States.

“I think it’s a very attractive deal,” Jordan said.

And his closing argument was about speed.

“The faster they move, the faster they get the stock in Curaleaf, and the faster that they get the benefit of the revaluation.”

The Bigger Bet Goes Beyond Aurora

Taken together, Jordan’s answers make the proposed Aurora acquisition easier to understand as one piece of a much larger thesis.

He is not arguing that Curaleaf needs Aurora to survive internationally. In fact, he explicitly says Curaleaf has alternative supply relationships, other companies it is talking to, and separate strategies for mid-tier and lower-priced products.

Aurora is positioned specifically as Curaleaf’s “premium play for Europe.” Jordan’s broader case is that Aurora can provide the premium genetics, scientific capabilities, and GMP-scale production Curaleaf wants, while Curaleaf can bring greater distribution, scale, and operating efficiencies to Aurora. He also sees opportunities to reduce costs, including through Aurora’s SG&A structure, creating what amounts to operational cross-pollination between the two businesses.

Jordan’s comments also make clear what Curaleaf does not want to build internationally: a business dependent primarily on buying and reselling flower at margins around 15%. His preferred model combines proprietary products and genetics with regulatory infrastructure, brands and distribution.

That makes Aurora more than a source of additional capacity. In Jordan’s thesis, it is a premium production and genetics asset that can be plugged into an international platform Curaleaf has already spent approximately $450 million building.

At the same time, Jordan is making several much larger bets.

He believes changes to hemp regulation could contribute 10% to 15% organic industry growth next year. He believes reduced illicit supply could help stabilize — and potentially increase — cannabis pricing. He expects Curaleaf to generate almost $100 million in free cash this year. He says the company has already invested roughly $450 million in Europe to address a market encompassing approximately 700 million people. He believes reproducing that European infrastructure today would cost more than $1 billion.

And he believes consolidation is coming.

Jordan’s estimate that combining two MSOs could potentially eliminate $150 million to $200 million in costs within 12 months is not an Aurora synergy forecast. It is something broader: his argument for why the current structure of the cannabis industry is unlikely to last.

He predicts that 2027 will bring several large transactions among major operators.

Whether Curaleaf-Aurora becomes the transaction that starts that process remains uncertain.

Someone else could bid more. Curaleaf could walk away. Aurora’s special committee could reach a different conclusion. The formal bid still has to be made.

But Curaleaf is preparing to make it.

And if Jordan’s larger thesis is right, Aurora may be less important as an isolated takeover target than as an early test of what the next phase of cannabis consolidation could look like.